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ABSTRACT 
Vehicle fuel economy has become the object of intense 
government regulation in the last two decades. In 1975 , 
Congress legislated Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards for all new cars produced after the 1978 model year. 
Today, Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations are being 
criticized as overly strict in an era of falling gasoline 
prices . This study provides an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of the controversial CAFE program and empirically 
analyzes its effects. 
The author concludes that the increase in fleet fuel 
economies , across the line, is approximately what one should 
have expected given the rise in real gasoline prices since 1968. 
Moreover, the main determinant of automobile fuel economy is the 
pump price of gasoline . The author finds that a higher federal 
gasoline tax would be a much more efficient approach to energy 
conservation and energy security. Empirical and historical 
evidence supports the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
Today, millions of cars, vans and light trucks will propel 
themselves over U.S. roads and highways. These vehicles account 
for a major part of overall fossil fuel use. In 1985, the 
American highway fleet, used largely for passenger travel , 
consisted of almost 172 million vehicles and accounted for 36 
percent of United States oil consumption (The Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association of the United States , "MVMA Motor 
Vehicle Facts & Figures," p. 36). By themselves, automobiles 
accounted for 28 percent of U.S. oil consumption and 12 percent 
of total energy consumption (Plotkin, Steven E., "The Road to 
Fuel efficiency," p . 19). Obviously, these vehicles represent 
the single largest available target for reducing oil consumption 
in the United States (Figure 1.1). 
After a decade of slackened rules and deregulation, the 
federal government recently redirected its attention towards a 
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3 
more active involvement in improving vehicle energy efficiency. 
Under increasing pressure from environmentalists who are 
concerned about the "Greenhouse Effect", the Bush Administration 
stepped in with tighter energy security and energy efficiency 
regulations. The ultimate goal was to reduce both strategic oil 
imports and the environmental costs of oil use. 
But the road to energy conservation is a bumpy one. 
While some analysts of energy efficiency claim that average fuel 
economy can be twice or even three times the current average 
(given current technology), most automobile industry analysts 
disagree. All marketable economy improvement measures, they 
argue, have already been implemented on domestic automobiles, 
given today's relatively low gasoline prices. 
Almost all parties involved agree that considerable technical 
potential exists to improve the fuel efficiency of the domestic 
light-duty vehicle fleet. However, strong economic, social and 
technical forces combine to slow down potential progress in this 
area. 
The central premise of this paper is that federal policy 
makers can command needed changes. Regulators can "convince" 
automobile manufacturers that higher fuel economy standards are 
beneficial. However, policy makers have to consider a number of 
options when trying to induce automobile manufacturers to 
improve the fuel efficiency of their fleets. Their choice of 
feasible government policies will determine the future of the 
automobile and our environment as we know it. 
4 
"Automobilization" 
Since the dawn of this century, the automobile, or horseless 
carriage, has played a central role in the economic and social 
lives of millions. By the first decade of this century, 
American urban planners were heralding the "salvation" of the 
city and predicting that automobiles would soon render urban 
congestion a thing of the past (Brown, Lester, R. Running on 
Empty, p. 8). Of course this did not happen , and by the time 
the twenties came around, outright criticisms were heard 
concerning the dehumanization of vehicle assembly lines and the 
impact that automobile congestion had on communities . In the 
sixties and early seventies, Ralph Nader and Emma Rothschild 
attacked the violence, waste, and pollution that had come with 
the spread of cars (Brown, Lester, R. p. 8). 
Oddly enough, all these criticisms never turned the public 
away from the automobile's mystique . The growth of the world's 
auto fleet has been consistently high, slowing down only 
slightly during economic downturns and often leading the way 
back to prosperity. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, most 
developed countries experienced a very consistent rate of growth 
in their car populations. Fitting a curve to the data was a 
relatively simple matter. The important question was how .long 
5 
such a trend could be expected to continue. As with most 
durable goods, a saturation level at the top of the s-shaped 
curve is expected. In most published s tudies, there have been 
disagreements as to the estimate of the saturation level. One 
point of agreement is that the end is not yet in sight. Every 
year, millions of additional cars roll off the assembly lines 
and no country has yet experienced a plateau in its automobile 
population. 
Approximately forty (40) percent of the automobiles in the 
world can be found on U.S. highways, thirty (30) percent on 
highways in Western Europe, and fourteen (14) percent in other 
industrial countries (Brown, Lester, R . p. 4). In other words , 
eighty- three (83) percent of the world's population owns the 
remaining sixteen (16) percent of the world ' s cars. However, in 
recent years, automobile use has been expanding dramatically in 
Asia, Latin America , and more recently Eastern Europe. 
In the United States, the personal automobile has played an 
essential role in people's every day lives. It has shaped "the 
American Way of Life", economically as well as socially. People 
rely on the car for their livelihood, freedom, privacy, and 
status. This relationship was demonstrated during the 1973 oil 
crisis when millions of people all over the world were prepared 
to sit in gasoline lines for hours simply for a full tank of 
gas. The current status of the automobile almost guarantees its 
continued importance in the eyes of the consumer . The 
•automobilization ' of the world, as we know it, is not over yet. 
6 
Energy Conservation and Energy Security 
The transportation sector plays a tremendous role in United 
States ' fossil fuel dependence. In 1988, petroleum use by the 
transportation sector surpassed ten (10) million barrels a day 
(MBD), up by more than two (2) percent from 1987; a twenty (20) 
percent increase since 1973 (U.S., Congress , Senate. "Hearing 
before the Subcommittee of the Consumer, " p. 88). Oil demand 
for transportation purposes alone exceeded the United States' 
production of crude in 1988 by 750,000 barrels per day (U.S ., 
Congress, Senate. p.87). 
Domestic petroleum production has declined from a high of 
nine (9) MBD in 1985 to 8.1 MBD in 1988 (U.S., Congress, Senate. 
p. 88). While domestic production has decreased considerably, 
the total demand for oil in the States rose at the rate of half 
a million barrels per day throughout 1988 (U.S., Congress , 
Senate, p. 89). OPEC countries have been happily supplying a 
large percentage of this increase. Imports from OPEC sources 
were at an historic low of 1.8 MBD in 1985, according to 
Dr.Berg, assistant secretary of the Department of Energy, 
testifying before the Senate(Figure 1.2). However, in 1988, the 
Department of Energy observed that these OPEC imports had grown 
to 3.4 MBD. Ceteris paribus, if this trend continues we will 
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8 
encounter oil imports exceeding fifty (50) percent of the 
national requirements in the early 1990s. Economic theory 
predicts that with nationwide and worldwide demand for oil 
rising and oil producers colluding through OPEC, oil prices 
should rebound; recent evidence suggest that they are. Still, 
very few economists will go out on a limb and predict future oil 
prices. They have learned that many unpredictable factors, 
such as oil spills and wars, can have tremendous effects on the 
price of oil. 
Whether it be in the form of gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, 
or liquid propane gas the transportation sector relies almost 
totally on fossil fuels . After these fuels are burned in 
billions of combustion engines, they account for about one-third 
of emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States, the 
predominant gas involved in the "Greenhouse" effect. According 
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA}, of this thirty-
three (33) percent slice, fifty-eight (58) percent is 
contributed by cars and light trucks. The Energy Information 
Administration's (EIA) 1989 extrapolation to the year 2000 
requires a twenty (20} percent improvement in new light-duty 
vehicle MPG by the year 2000 if emissions of carbon dioxide were 
to stay constant or decrease slightly (U.S., Congress, Senate, 
p. 81) . 
Carbon dioxide, together with water vapor, nitrous oxide and 
methane are the key players in the "Greenhouse" effect. These 
gases, which occur naturally in the atmosphere, serve as a 
9 
thermal blanket around the earth. They allow sunrays to pass 
through the earth's atmosphere to the surface. Before this 
radiation has a chance to escape back into space, the figurative 
blanket traps some of it. However, greenhouse gases are not 
necessarily detrimental. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) estimated (in a study on greenhouse gas emissions (1986)) 
that without these gases, the earth would be thirty (30) degrees 
Celsius colder. According to Richard D. Morgenstern, the 
Director of the Off ice of Policy Analysis for the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide has increased approximately twenty-five (25) percent in 
the past hundred (100) years, due to fossil fuel combustion, 
industrial and agricultural activities . There is a consensus 
that if the concentration of Greenhouse gases were increased , 
the atmospheric temperature would increase and the earth's 
climate would change . However, there is considerable 
uncertainty within the scientific community about the timing and 
the magnitude of this expected global warming. 
Obviously, the transportation sector, because of its near-
exclusive reliance on fossil fuels and because of the growing 
size of its petroleum consumption, is a critical element in 
addressing energy conservation and security problems (Figure 
1.3). Higher fuel efficiency could be part of a national 
strategy to diminish our rising dependence on imported oil, 
reduce our total energy consumption, and minimize our production 
of Greenhouse gases. 
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11 
The current Regulatory Framework 
Although some may argue that government policies have been 
designed to do away with the automobile altogether, it is 
obvious that policy makers have attempted to 'clean up' its act 
rather than substitute something else for it. So far, the 
automobile industry has been affected by the three " C's" of the 
regulatory authorities: crashworthiness, clean air, and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy {CAFE). Legislation pertaining 
to these regulated fields was enacted in the following pieces of 
legislation: 
* National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966; 
*Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1989; 
* Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 
1972 ; 
* Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
regulates the safety standards; the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulates air pollution while the Secretary of 
Transportation sets fuel economy standards (Crandall, Robert w. 
Regulating the Automobile, p. 2) . 
12 
Occupant and Vehicle Safety 
Safety standards are enacted by an executive branch agency: 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
NHTSA ' s performance standards set minimum safety guidelines 
under diverse operating conditions to improve occupant safety 
and reduce repair bills resulting from accidents. Energy-
absorbing designs have made today ' s automobiles more 
crashworthy than ever. This implies that occupants should be 
safer, provided they choose to buckle-up. In this context , one 
of the most pressing and controversial issues in safety 
regulation before the NHTSA should be mentioned: the passive 
restraint requirement. "Passive" safety suggests that safety 
devices (either automatic three- point belts or belt/airbag 
layouts) work regardless of the occupant ' s intent or actions. 
In 1984 , the NHTSA required passive r estraints for driver and 
front- seat passenger in all 1990 cars. However, a 1987 
amendment (Simanaitis, Dennis, "Welcome to the (Over?)Regulated 
Nineties," p. 93) extended the passive restraint requirement to 
the 1994 model year. The actions of activists have tied up 
passive restraint requirements before the Agency and the courts 
for twenty years. All together, there are more than fifty (50) 
separate safety standards for automobiles today (Crandall , 
Robert W. Regulating the Automobile, p. 3). 
13 
Clean Air 
Emission regulations are set by Congress, unlike most 
automobile standards which are set by Executive Branch Agencies 
(Such as the NHTSA and the EPA) . In 1970 , the Clean Air Act set 
very ambitious goals for the reduction of pollutants. 
Hydrocarbons , carbon monoxide, and oxides of nitrogen were to be 
reduced ninety (90) percent of the average levels in 1968 by 
1975 (Crandall, Robert W. p. 3). These deadlines were not 
implemented because vehicle producers convinced the Government 
to delay their implementation. By 1981 , the carbon monoxide 
and hydrocarbon goals had been achieved. Achieving the nitrogen 
oxide standard, however, appeared to be troublesome. 
Subsequently, the admissible levels were increased and the 
original standard was renamed a " research goal " (White, Lawrence 
J . The Regulation of Air Pollutant Emissions from Motor 
Vehicles, p. 22). Still , tremendous improvements have been 
made. Compared to a car running without emissions controls , a 
car with controls dispenses ninety-six (96) percent less 
hydrocarbons, ninety-six (96) percent less carbon monoxide, and 
seventy- six (76) percent less oxides of nitrogen {Simanaitis, 
Dennis. "Welcome to the (Over?)Regulated Nineties," p. 95) . 
The EPA has the responsibility for establishing durability 
standards for emissions-control components. Government 
regulations now require the equipment to hold together for five 
14 
(5) years or 50,000 miles . The Air Resources Board in 
California which has traditionally led the way in clean air 
regulation is proposing durability requirements of ten (10) 
years or 100,000 miles. 
More Miles per Gallon of Gasoline 
Until the 1973-74 OPEC oil embargo and the subsequent rise in 
real gasoline prices, neither consumers nor automobile 
manufacturers were too concerned about the fuel efficiency of 
automobiles. This lack of attention to fuel economy before 
1973 was understandable considering the decline in the real 
price of oil until that time. 
In the aftermath of the oil embargo, the need to make cars 
more efficient became painfully clear and urgent. During the 
late seventies, under the pressure of escalating fuel prices, 
the consumer demand for energy-efficient cars soared. Efficient 
cars were selling at inflated prices, while " Cadillacs" were 
being offered with big discounts. 
In addition to the pressures of consumer demand for more 
efficient cars, the federal government enacted Title V of the 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost savings Act, which 
established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements 
for both passenger cars and light trucks. These standards were 
enacted by Congress amid tremendous opposition from the 
automobile industry. The standards apply to the weighted 
15 
average of a producer's total output each year, including small, 
medium, and full-sized cars. Consequently, it will not suffice 
for a company to produce three small economy models and one 
full-size car if the full-size one outsells the econo-cars. In 
addition, the CAFE standards demand yearly improvements in the 
fuel efficiency of new cars sold in the United States; from 18.0 
Miles per Gallon (MPG) in 1978 to 27.5 MPG in 1985 and later 
years (Figure 1.4). 
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY -- 1978 - 1989 
Year Chrysler Ford 
1978 18.4 18.4 
1979 20.5 19.2 
1980 22.3 22.9 
1981 26.8 24.1 
1982 27.6 25.0 
1983 26.9 24.3 
1984 27.8 25.8 
1985 27.8 26.6 
1986 27.8 27.0 
1987 27.6 26.8 
1988 28.4 26.4 
1989 27.7 26.6 
1990Est. 27. 5 26.5 
G.M. CAFE Domestic 
Standard Avg. 
19.0 18.0 18.7 
19.1 19.0 19.3 
22.6 20.0 22.6 
23.8 22.0 24.2 
24.6 24.0 25.0 
24.0 26.0 24.6 
24.9 27.0 25.6 
25.8 27.5 26.4 
26.6 26.0 26.9 
26.4 26.0 26.7 
27.6 26.0 27.3 
26.9 26.5 26.9 
27.0 27.5 
Import 
Avg. 
27.3 
26.1 
29.5 
31. 5 
31.1 
32.2 
31.8 
31.5 
31.7 
31.1 
31. 2 
30.7 
(Kurylko, Diana T. "CAFE credits help Ford, GM," p.26) 
Total 
Fleet 
19.9 
20.3 
24.3 
25.9 
26.6 
26.4 
26.9 
27.6 
28.1 
28.4 
28.7 
28.3 
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17 
If a review process found that a certain car or light-truck 
producer did not meet the CAFE standard, that producer was 
subject to a monetary fine. The magnitude of this fine depended 
on the difference in MPG between the fuel economy actually 
reached by the producer and the CAFE standard times fifty (50) 
dollars for every car produced. For example, if the standard is 
thirty (30) MPG and the manufacturer makes one million cars with 
an average fuel efficiency of twenty-eight and a half (28.5) 
MPG, that firm is liable for a fine of seventy-five (75) million 
dollars (Figure 1.4). 
For those who exceeded the CAFE requirement in the three 
previous model years, "carry-over" credits were awarded that 
could be applied to the CAFE level in a given year. If no 
"carry-forward" credits are available, the firm has the option 
of using any "carry-back" credits it expects to earn in the next 
three model years if it can convince the National Highway 
Transport and Safety Administration (NHTSA) that such 
expectations are reasonable. 
Amended legislation divided a company ' s passenger fleet into 
two distinct and separate groups. Foreign-produced cars and 
domestic-produced cars of a company were to be averaged 
separately. This addition to the CAFE legislation was designed 
specifically to prevent U.S. manufacturers from meeting the 
mileage standards by importing small foreign cars. 
In an additional amendment to fuel economy legislation, gas 
guzzler taxes (producers' excise taxes) were attached to cars 
18 
that failed to achieve a set fuel economy (Crandall, Robert W. 
Regulating the Automobile, p.121). These taxes, imposed in 
1980, are designed to penalize manufacturers for producing 
specific model lines that fall short of a given average mileage 
in each model year. At present, only cars that fall below the 
twenty-two and a half (22.5) MPG threshold are subject to the 
tax (Figure 1.5). As the fuel efficiency of these gas guzzlers 
goes down, the gas guzzler tax goes up to a maximum of $3850 for 
a twelve (12) MPG car. 
1990 GAS GUZZLER TAX SCALE 
Milage (miles per gallon) 
22.5 or more 
21.5-22.5 
20.5-21.5 
19.5-20.5 
18.5-19.5 
17.5-18.5 
16.5-17.5 
15.5-16 . 5 
14 .5-15.5 
13.5-14.5 
12.5-13.5 
Less than 12.5 
Tax (dollars) 
0 
500 
650 
850 
1,050 
1,300 
1,500 
1.850 
2,250 
2,700 
3,200 
3,850 
(Crandall, Robert W. Regulating the Automobile, p.138) 
For the model years after 1984, the NHTSA was given the 
authority to increase the standard to the: "maximum feasible 
average fuel economy" after taking into account four factors: 
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20 
"Technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect 
of other federal motor vehicle standards such as emission 
controls on fuel economy, and the need of the nation to conserve 
energy." ("NHTSA annual report on fuel economy," 1982, p.9) 
The Winds of Political Change 
For eight years, the Reagan Administration waged a 
philosophical war against more binding Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards and unsuccessfully tried to get 
Congress to repeal CAFE requirements altogether. Their actions 
included: 
* Relaxing the 1986-87-88 statutory CAFE standard for 
passenger cars; 
* Lowering the 1985 and later light-truck CAFE 
standards; 
* Relaxing CAFE test procedures; 
* Terminating the rulemaking to raise CAFE standards for 
1986 and subsequent model years. 
During his campaign in 1988, George Bush distanced himself 
from the politics of the Reagan Administration in his handling 
of environmental issues. After his election, President Bush 
placed environmental issues central on the agenda. Ever since, 
21 
he has made all the symbolic right moves, from jumping on the 
disastrous Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska to appointing a 
respected environmentalist, William K. Reilly, as head of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Following a long, hot summer (1988) with much talk in the 
media about global warming and the "Greenhouse effect", it was 
obvious that something had to happen. After eight years of 
"deregulation", President Bush is moving the United States to 
what various members of the administration have called " a new 
balance" (Kurylko, Diana T. , "The Bush Revolution: Tighter 
Rules, " p.l). Samuel K. Skinner, the new Transportation 
Secretary, has targeted the U.S. dependence on foreign oil and 
pollution concerns as major issue s. Symbolizing the break from 
Reagan ' s policy, he focused on the automobile industry as an 
example. 
In its first year, the Bush Administration (re) introduced 
three important policy changes that affect the automobile 
industry: 
* It returned the Corporate Average Fuel Economy {CAFE) 
rules that require auto makers' fleets to average 
certain mpg to 27 . 5 mpg. This occurred after many 
delays, the last of which rolled back the 
requirements and proposed to junk CAFE altogether. 
* A renewed interest in developing new vehicle safety 
mandates, s uch as pas sive restraints. 
22 
* It proposed regulations that would require automobile 
manufacturers to set tougher emission standards. 
Of the new policy changes, Transportation Secretary Skinner 
said in an interview: "When the government gets out of balance , 
you h ave to bring it back into balance ..•. We had the Reagan 
Administration for eight years, and the Bush administration sat 
-back and said, 'What 's the impact of what's happened and how 
should we modify it?' " (Kurylko, Diana T., "The Bush 
Revolution: tighter rules," p. 52). 
The Effects of Fuel Efficiency Regulations 
What did the federal government demand from the automobile 
manufacturers? In 1980 the government wanted 20.0 miles per 
gallon (mpg). This figure increased by 2.0 mpg annually, for the 
next three years;in 1984, the figure then increased by 1.0 mpg. 
At this point the standard stood at 27.0 mpg. In 1985, it rose 
to 27.5 mpg, but was then rolled back to 26.0 mpg for the next 
three years under pressure from Ford and General Motors who 
threatened to close factories in the States if they were forced 
to meet "unreasonable" fuel-efficiency standards . In 1989, the 
standard increased again to 26 . 5 mpg. In 1990, it will be 27.5 
mpg which is the CAFE figure originally set for 1985 (Jeanes, 
23 
William. "The CAFE Society," p. 5). 
How well did the U.S. manufacturers meet the CAFE standards? 
Since 1978 , Chrysler met or exceeded them every year. GM met 
CAFE in 1978- 1982, but failed by 2.0 mpg when the standard 
increased to 26 mpg in 1983. GM did not meet the standard again 
until the 1986 rollback. Ford ' s performance was similar to that 
of GM. Ford failed in 1983-1985 and met the standard only with 
the rollback. However , real progress has been made. Chrysler 
started with 22.3 mpg in 1980 and is expected to reach 27.5 mpg 
in 1990 . Ford started at 22.9 mpg in 1980 and believes 26 . 5 mpg 
is feasible in 1990. GM had 22.6 mpg in 1980 and predicts 27.0 
for 1990. Stated in percentages, Chrysler ' s gas mileage 
improved by 23.3 percent, Ford's by 15.7 percent and GM ' s by 
19.5 percent. It should be noted that these improvements are 
spread over a ten year period. When we look at the annualized 
results, we get a much bleaker picture: Chrysler gained 2.12 
percent, Ford improved 1.47 percent , and GM gained 1.79 percent 
(Figure 1. 6). 
Then there is the gas guzzler tax. This tax shows up 
explicitly on a car's list price (the "window sticker"). In 
1988 , the gas guzzler total came to $116.8 million. This amount 
has declined from a high of $147.7 million in 1986 (Simanaitis, 
Dennis. "Welcome to the (Over?)Regulated Nineties, " p. 93). The 
Laborghini Countach was the nation ' s worst (best?) gas guzzler 
in 1988 with a 6 mpg city and 10 mpg highway average. In the 
Lamborghini's case, the gas guzzler tax added the maximum fine 
N
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25 
of $3850 to its $145,000 tag (Simanaitis, Dennis. p. 95). 
Although $3850 (the worst case scenario) is a substantial tax, 
the question remains if a buyer of a 100,000 dollar-plus 
automobile really cares. 
Market Factors Restraining Increases in Fuel Economy 
Improvements in new car fuel economy that began in 1975 
essentially ended in 1985 when CAFE regulations were rolled 
back. The primary reason for this slow-down in fleet fuel 
economy stems from a lack of strong market pressures. 
After the Arab oil embargo, increases in the real price of 
gasoline would have forced a response from the automobile 
companies even without government fuel economy regulations. 
When gasoline prices were relatively high, car manufacturers 
made tremendous improvements in fuel efficiency every year. 
CAFE standards were met by all three domestic producers until 
1981 when real gasoline prices began to fall. In fact, there is 
little evidence that CAFE regulations imposed a binding 
constraint on automobile producers until real fuel prices 
declined again. 
In addition to the low price of gasoline (with little public 
expectation of a future price increase), the non- fuel costs of 
operating a vehicle (i.e. insurance, price, maintenance ... ) have 
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27 
increased steadily, making fuel costs a smaller, less important 
part of total costs (Figure 1.7). Available driver surveys seem 
to confirm these allegations. In 1980, when gasoline prices 
were escalating, 32 percent of the consumers who participated in 
the survey listed fuel economy as the most important factor they 
would consider when buying their next automobile. By 1987, when 
consumers were questioned again, only 3 percent picked fuel 
economy as their primary selection criteria for their next car 
(Plotkin, Steven E. "The Road to Fuel Efficiency," p.20). 
Manufacturers' Responses to Declining Fuel Prices 
Since the early 1980s, when the trend towards smaller, more 
fuel-efficient cars was reversed by lower gasoline prices 
(Figure 1.8), automobile manufacturers have come up with some 
interesting loopholes that allow them to sell to the consumers 
what they want. Helen o. Petrauskas, Ford Vice President for 
Environmental and Safety Engineering at Ford Motor Company 
testified during a Senate hearing : "To maintain high levels of 
small cars--it takes about two small car sales to offset (the 
fuel consumption of) one large car--Ford has invested some 3 
billion since 1982 in rebates and other marketing incentives for 
the purchase of our most fuel-efficient vehicles." (Flax, 
Arthur . "Debate over CAFE heats up," p.24). When the "new and 
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29 
improved" Ford Escort appears in the market place later this 
year, Ford's pricing will insure a loss on every one sold to a 
dealer (Jeanes, William. "Of good deals and level fields," p.7). 
The logic behind this un-American strategy is that where CAFE 
is concerned, the manufacturer sells one car line at a loss, 
hoping that the inflated profits on larger cars, plus the 
avoidance of CAFE fines, will result in a profit. In 1988 , the 
combined profits of Ford, GM, and Chrysler were $10.35 billion 
(Jeanes, William. " The CAFE society, " p. 5). Obviously, Ford's 
strategy to 'avoid' CAFE seems to be working. 
Other manufacturers simply pay the CAFE fine. Mercedes-Benz, 
for example, amassed 20.6 million dollars in fines when it did 
not reach the CAFE standards in 1987 (Simanaitis , Dennis. 
"Welcome to the (Over?)Regulated Nineties," p. 93). 
Another CAFE amendment which seems to be backfiring is the 75 
percent domestic content rule. When lawmakers wrote the CAFE 
regulations more than a decade ago, they were interested in more 
than just saving energy. As a result, they added a clause that 
forbids U.S. car manufacturers from including imported cars 
(such as the Dodge Colt) in domestic fuel economy calculations. 
All this was implemented to force the domestic manufacturers to 
build more small cars in the United States. Since both GM and 
Chrysler get most of their fuel economizers from their 
affiliates in Japan and Korea (Flint , Jerry. "With Friends like 
this ••• ," p.48), they cannot count these imported models in 
their average efficiency calculations. This requirement is now 
30 
'forcing' the domestics to make more than 25 percent of the 
content of some of its larger fuel inefficient cars abroad. As a 
result, less than 75 percent of their content will be domestic 
which will take them off the CAFE balance sheet of U.S. produced 
cars and make them official imports. such is the fate of Ford's 
Crown Victoria and Mercury Marquis (two of America's most 
"American" full size cars) (Simanaitis, Dennis . "Welcome to the 
{Over?) Regulated Nineties," p . 93). 
Another area where CAFE regulations might have disasterous 
side effects for the domestic industry is that of large, gas-
guzzling Japanese imports. For many years, small, efficient 
Japanese imports were the rule. They met and surpassed CAFE 
regulations . As credits were awarded for 'beating' CAFE, these 
importers built up enough CAFE dollars to enable them to go up-
scale into the luxury car bracket and still meet whatever 
standard is set. This has occurred at a time when domestic 
companies will have to downsize their fleets in order to avoid 
huge fines. Chrysler's President Bob Lutz warned that this 
might invite: "another import invasion of the U.S. car market 
similar to the one in the 1970s." (Versical, David. "Small-car 
content shift leads GM's CAFE plan," p.61). The proof that such 
an "invasion" might be imminent can be observed in the 1989 
introduction in the United States of two new Japanese luxury car 
lines: Infiniti and Lexus . 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy requirements were established 
to make passenger vehicles more fuel efficient. As these 
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32 
standards mainly affect automobiles, CAFE fuel savings could be 
undermined by the growth in demand for pickup trucks and mini 
vans relative to auto sales (Figure 1.9). These light duty 
vehicles are mainly used for day to day, non-commercial 
passenger travel and are substantially less efficient than 
automobiles. Where the average 1988 fleet fuel economy for new 
automobiles stood at about 28 . 7 mpg (Kurylko, Diana T. "CAFE 
credits help ford, GM," p. 26), the fleet average for new pickup 
trucks and mini vans reached about 21 mpg (Plotkin, Steve E. 
"The Road to Fuel Efficiency," p. 20). The Department of 
Transportation did establish CAFE standards for light trucks at 
21 mpg for 1989 (Flax, Arthur. "Ecology, car demand set to 
clash," p. 80). Yet their standards remain lower than t h ose for 
passenger cars. As a result, the continued shift in demand away 
from passenger cars to pickups and minivans is bound to result 
in overall higher fuel consumption (Figure 1 . 10). 
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CHAPI'ER II 
ECONOMICA.L ANALYSIS OF VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMIES 
Methodology 
The evidence provided thus far on the effect of Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy regulations on vehicle efficiency has led 
us to believe that CAFE has not made any substantial difference 
on vehicle fuel efficiency . To analyze the impact of fuel 
prices as well as government regulations on vehicle fuel 
economy, a more precise method of testing is required. 
Multiple regression analysis is an econometric procedure that 
links the relevant features together within a mathematical 
model . This theoretical framework can indicate, with a certain 
degree of confidence, how changes in independent variables will 
affect the dependent variable. 
A simple multiple regression equation defines a linear 
relationship between independent variables and a dependent one. 
For example: 
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Y C + blXl + b2X2 + E 
where: y = dependent variable 
c = constant (vertical intercept) 
bl= coefficient of Xl 
b2= coefficient of X2 
Xl= independent variable (suspected to influence Y) 
X2= independent variable (suspected to influence Y) 
E = error term 
Once data has been collected for Xl , X2 , and Y, it can be 
used in one of two distinctly different ways to fit the linear 
relationship. When collected cross sectionally, similar data 
from different sources is observed at a given point in time . 
Time series studies analyze similar data from the same 
source(s), collected over subsequent time periods . The subject 
at hand lends itself to both cross sectional and time series 
analysis. In this study, time series data is manipulated to test 
the significant relationships between the variables. 
In order to find estimators which are the best linear 
unbiased efficient estimators and consistent with the sampled 
population, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique was 
employed. The estimated coefficients will possess the OLS 
properties if they agree with the following assumptions: 
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* Xl and X2 are linearly related to Y; 
* Xls and X2s are non-stochastic (non-random and fixed) ; 
* there is no first or second order autocorrelation (the 
error terms are unrelated over time) ; 
* there is no multicollinearity; 
* there is no heteroscedasticity 
After the regression coefficients are determined, several 
statistics can be used to test whether the above conditions 
hold. If one or more of the previous assumptions are violated, 
significance tests could lead to false conclusions. To test the 
above assumptions, several factors are analyzed: the Durbin 
Watson, the coefficient of determination (Rsq), Chisq, and the 
correlation matrix. Significance tests apply the t-statistic, 
and the F-statistic. 
Multiple regression analysis calculations could be carried 
out by hand. However, if the econometric model contains more 
than a few independent variables, the arithmetic involved would 
be formidable. As a result, multiple regression analysis is 
almost invariably carried out by computers. Statistical 
computer packages produce virtually all the information desired 
for a proper statistical analysis. Because these packages have 
greatly eased the arithmetic burden involved in regression 
analysis, this technique is now widely used in the investigation 
of data. In this particular study, most of the statistical 
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estimations will be carried out by the MICRO-TSP statistical 
package on an IBM-XT personal computer. 
Previous Works 
Energy conservation measures and policies for light- duty 
transportation have been widely studied . However, the field has 
been characterized by: 
* extensive technical literature, discussing alternative 
technologies to improve vehicle fuel economies. These 
studies are usually not compatible as technological 
measures are not standardized; 
* few studies that only compare price-change measures 
with measures that improve fuel efficiencies; 
* many works using accounting techniques rather than 
econometric ones to come to a conclusion ; 
* few recent studies that incorporate the evidence 
provided by falling real gasoline prices since 1981; 
* many emotional approaches to fuel conservation issues , 
traditionally conducted shortly after global warming 
or other environmental scares. 
Much of the previous work focuses solely on technological 
measures. One of the earlier studies for the Environmental 
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Protection Agency (EPA) by the Off ice of Technology Assessment 
analyzed relevant technology for improving the usage of 
vehicular energy (U . S ., Congress, House, "Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations," p. 11- 64). 
Another recent study conducted for the National Science 
Foundation by the Urban Institute compared power train 
technology and weight related strategies. 
In 1986 , Robert W. Crandall of The Brookings Institution 
discussed federal regulations and the automobile industry. This 
work remains one of the most comprehensive in the field, yet it 
excluded the price of gasoline in its analysis. In chapter six 
of his book Regulating the Automobile, Crandall treated the 
regulation of fuel economy . To estimate the temporal pattern of 
changes in fuel economy and the impact of the CAFE standards, he 
devised the following relationship: 
MPG = f (DISP, WT, FWD) 
where MPG is the miles per gallon for a specified driving mode , 
DISP is the interior volume of the engine in cubic inches , WT is 
the curb weight, and FWD is a dummy variable for the front-
wheel- drive vehicle designs . This equation was estimated in 
loglinear form since the effect of weight and engine size were 
expected to be multiplicative. In addition, time dummies were 
included to capture the effect of other influences such 
regulation and technological change. The estimated values 
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appear on table 6-4 (Crandall, Robert W. Regulating the 
Automobile, p. 128) In each case, the estimated effect of weight 
on fuel economy is very large and statistically significant. 
DISP is also inversely correlated with fuel economy, as 
expected. Finally, front-wheel-drive cars appear to achieve 
between two (2) a eight (8) percent better fuel economies than 
their rear-wheel-drive counterparts. The coefficients of the 
time dummies show the technological improvement in vehicle 
design. They suggest no fuel economy improvements until 1975 or 
1976, but steady improvements thereafter. 
Had there been no CAFE standards, what would the fuel economy 
have been? Most likely, according to Robert Crandall, vehicle 
producers could have expected to increase fuel economy as long 
as the gain in operating costs of the car was as least as great 
as the increase in the cost of producing and distributing the 
car. He translated the cost-minimizing choice of fuel economy 
(E) and vehicle price (P) as: 
c = (pgM/E) / rP 
where c is the elasticity of the cost of producing the vehicle 
with respect to fuel efficiency, pg is the price of gasoline, M 
is the annual vehicle miles traveled by the consumer, and r is 
the cost of capital to the consumer for holding a durable good 
such as an automobile. The above equation simply states that 
automobile manufacturers should of fer fuel economy on each model 
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line up to the point where the elasticity of the cost of 
production with respect to fuel economy is equal to the ratio of 
annual gasoline costs to the annual capital costs of holding the 
car. The results of the equation suggest that automobile 
manufacturers should have increased fuel efficiency by about 
twenty-six (26) percent from 1970 to 1983 (Crandall, p. 135). 
In reality, Ford and General Motors exceeded the twenty-six (26) 
percent prediction, but Chrysler fell somewhat short of it. 
overall, the improvement of fuel economy for the industry was 
very near to what would have been expected without the CAFE 
standards, according to Robert W. Crandall from Brookings. 
Andrew N. Kleit, an economist for the Federal Trade 
Commission, developed a static model of CAFE standards that 
analyzed savings in gasoline from the flow of new cars, as well 
as the change in the stock of used automobiles due to the change 
in the price of new cars. Equilibrium prices and quantities 
were computed through a series of five demand and five supply 
equations (Kleit, Andrew N. "The Impact of Automobile Fuel 
Economy Standards," p. 16). He determined the quantity demanded 
by a set of linear demand curves, while quantity supplied was 
determined by a set of linear supply curves. The most important 
conclusion to be derived from running the comparative static 
model was that imposing CAFE standards could create tremendous 
losses for the economy. For example, imposing an increase in 
fuel economy levels of 1.5 MPG would cost the economy about $3.5 
billion (Kleit, Andrew N. p. 19). 
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In an attempt to measure the gasoline savings from CAFE 
standards, John E. Kwoka Jr. traced the consumption of new cars 
sold under the CAFE standard and compared that to the 
consumption that would have taken place without the imposition 
of CAFE. His addition to the literature included the "scrappage 
effect", the change in the stock of used cars that resulted from 
a change in the prices of new automobiles (Kwoka, John E. Jr. , 
"The Limits of Market Oriented Regulatory Techniques, " p. 699). 
The average miles driven and the scrappage rate for cars were 
the most important variables in this model. Kwoka showed that 
if the purchase price of new cars was significantly raised, it 
caused a decrease in the scrappage rates of used cars . The 
observed effect was so large that the higher price of new cars 
with more stringent pollution standards could actually increase 
pollution levels (Kwoka, John E . Jr. p. 702.). 
Finally, a recent study by Winston Clifford attempted a 
limited evaluation of four policy instruments . The effects of 
cost functions, marginal cost differentials, demand forecasting 
models, and voluntary export restrictions were examined. 
(Winston, Clifford. Blind Intersection? Policy and the 
Automobile Industry, 1987). 
Given the nature of past relevant work in the field, it seems 
obvious that the best contribution can be made by devising and 
applying a narrow analytical framework. This work uses insights 
gained from previous studies and seeks to evaluate past and 
future policies through the use of recent data. Finally, this 
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study seeks to extend its usefulness by evaluating individual 
policy instruments found to be most promising by the author. 
Analytical Framework 
A chauffeur of a vehicle produces an output, miles driven, 
much as a baker produces bread. Both the chauffeur and the 
baker combine many different inputs to produce their respective 
outputs. The baker utilizes an oven, flour, sugar, salt, water, 
and labor to bake bread; the chauffeur combines a vehicle, 
gasoline and oil, maintenance, and time to produce miles driven. 
Since vehicle miles driven may be viewed as an output, 
production function theory can be applied to the above scenario. 
As the price of a specific input rises, other inputs will be 
substituted for the now more expensive input. For example, if 
the price of flour goes up, the baker might mix more salt, 
sugar, and water and less flour into the batter. Similarly, as 
the price of automobile fuel increases, the chauffeur could 
reduce his speed, using more of his time but less gasoline to 
produce miles. He could also use more maintenance and less fuel 
by having his car tuned-up more often. Choosing not to utilize 
power-assisted options such as air-conditioners would also help 
to produce the same number of miles with less gasoline. Lastly, 
our chauffeur could opt to exchange his vehicle altogether for 
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one with better fuel efficiency ratings. 
There is a certain rate attributed to the substitution 
process of gasoline for other inputs as the price for gasoline 
fluctuates. This rate is called the elasticity of substitution 
of gasoline . In the following model, it is assumed that the 
elasticity of substitution of fuel in the production of miles 
driven remains constant. 
As each individual chauffeur substitutes a combination of 
inputs for more expensive fuel in the production of miles 
driven, more or less of a particular input might be used. This 
is where the importance of power-assisted equipment options, 
vehicle size, and specific vehicle economy comes in. Between 
1981 and 1986, the real price of gasoline fell. During most of 
that period, not only did the proportion of new cars with air 
conditioning, four-wheel-drive, and other power assisted 
equipment increase, average highway speeds (associated with a 
substantial energy loss) increased as well (U.S., Congress, 
Senate. "Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Consumer," p. 
30-31). The following model does not distinguish between the 
individual effects of changes in driving habits, choice of 
vehicle, or choice of power accessories . 
From production function theory, miles per gallon (MPG) is 
an output/input ratio. It consists of the number of units of 
output--vehicle miles traveled--for each unit of input, a gallon 
of gasoline. It is used in the following econometric model to 
estimate the elasticity of substitution of fuel by regressing it 
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against a measure of the real price of gasoline. 
Transportation- related conservation measures can thus be 
categorized as: 
*measures that reduce vehicle miles traveled in light-
duty vehicles; 
*measures that improve average vehicular fuel economy 
and energy efficiency. 
Reductions in vehicle miles traveled can be obtained by measures 
that increase the overall cost of driving, encourage and improve 
public transportation, restrict gasoline availability, or reduce 
the average trip length. Gains in average vehicular fuel 
economy can be achieved through technological improvements (for 
example, new ceramic engines or different fuels) or through 
transportation management policies such as speed limits or 
reductions in traffic congestion. 
Because of the complexity of the subject at large, this 
addition to the research focuses solely on measures that reduce 
vehicle miles traveled and improve average fuel economy • It 
does not attempt to deal with policies that would encourage or 
limit the importation or production of gasoline in the United 
States. Conclusions about the relative attractiveness of the 
input/output instruments are also strongly dependent on 
simplifying assumptions with respect to a number of factors. 
These include the prompt adoption by car manufacturers of new 
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technologies in response to real price c hanges of gasoline or 
new cars. 
Empirical Model 
In order to assess the actual change in vehicle fuel economy 
(MPG), the following time-series model was hypothesized and 
fitted to data collected from the period 1967-1988. 
MPG C + blREALP + b2FEDREG + b3MPGLAS + E 
Where: MPG = A harmonic fuel economy average based on fifty-
five (55) percent city and fourty-five (45) 
percent highway driving for the United States ' 
light-duty fleet. This statistic is reported in 
Miles per gallon (MPG). Data for this statistic 
were collected from various Environmental 
Protection Agency Papers (EPA 840499, 1984 ,p. 4; 
and EPA 890234, 1989, p. 7) 
REALP= The real price of gasoline reported in 1967 
Dollars (1967 = 100) . To calculate this 
statistic, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
motor fuels is divided by the total CPI. Figures 
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were obtained from Robert W. Crandall {Crandall, 
Regulating the Automobile, p. 122) and reported in 
cents. 
FEDREG= This variable accounts for the effects of federal 
fuel efficiency regulations on miles per gallon. 
It is set equal to one {l) in 1978 and later 
years; before 1978, it was set equal to zero (0). 
The value of the dummy-variable is changed in 1978 
because the first federal CAFE standards for all 
new cars applied in the 1978 model year. 
MPGLAS= Miles per gallon {MPG) during the last period. 
The inclusion of last year's fleet fuel 
efficiency as an independent variable is 
rationalized by assuming that new technologies, 
improving vehicle fuel economy, can not be 
implemented over the period of one (1) year. Most 
automobile manufacturers claim that new model 
lead times to implement new designs into 
production usually take more than two (2) and 
less than eight (8) years. 
C = Constant 
E = error term 
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Econometric Results 
After running a least squares multiple regression on the 
computer (see the accompanying portion of the computer output), 
the following sample equation of the regression was derived. 
MPG= -1.016 + 0.026 REALP + 0.753 FEDREG + 0.921 MPGLAS 
(0.010) (0.759) (0.062 ) 
Rsq = 0.988 Rsq (adj ) = 0.986 F-stat = 470.9 
The figures in parentheses beneath the least squares 
parameter estimates are the corresponding estimated standard 
errors. For simplicity's sake, 'C' (-1.016) and its estimated 
standard error will be dropped from the analysis as it falls 
outside the relevant range of the independent variables and thus 
need not be interpreted. 
Evaluation of the Overall Model 
The evaluation of the overall model is performed by 
conducting an F- test. This test determines the significance of 
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the model . If accepted, the F-test will prove that some of the 
variation in Vehicle Fuel efficiency is accounted for by 
variation(s) in at least one of the indepe ndent variables. 
Ho b 1=b2=b3 
Ha : at least o ne h*O 
F- s t a t . = 470 . 9 
F 3 , 17 , . 01 = 5 . 18 
F 3 , 17 , .05 = 3.20 
At both the one (1) percent and (5) percent significance 
levels , we have to strongly reject the null Hypothesis (Ho) and 
accept the alternative hypothesis (Ha). This model, then, seems 
to have overall significance in explaining light- duty fuel 
efficiencies. 
Evaluation of goodness of fit 
By reporting and interpreting the Rsq and the adjusted Rsq, 
the goodness- of-fit of the sample model to the data is 
evaluated. 
The Rsq equals 0.98. Taken together, the three independent 
variables explain 98.8 percent of the variability in Vehicle 
Fuel Efficiency (VFE) . 
Rsq(adj . ) equals 98 . 6 . Taken together and adjusted for the 
number of independent variables as a propo rtion of the number of 
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sample points, the three independent variables explain 98.6 
percent of the variability in the dependent variable. 
Significance Tests 
By performing separate t-tests on the individual independent 
variables, whether or not they have a significant effect on the 
dependent variable, Vehicle Fuel Efficiency (VFE) may be 
determined. 
Ho : b1 = 0 
Ha : b1 = 0 
t-stats = 2.600 
0.991 
14.96 
t 17, .05 = 1.7396 
At the five (5) percent significance level, for all the 
independent variables except FEDREG, Ha is accepted and the null 
hypothesis (Ho) rejected. This test, then, contains some very 
strong evidence that fuel economy legislation is not linearly 
related to the dependent variable-the United States light-duty 
fleet's fuel economy. However, two variables, REALP and MPGLAS 
are significant. 
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Estimate Implications 
The implications of the significant variables are examined 
below: 
1. All else being equal, when the real price of gasoline 
rises by one (1) cent, Vehicle Fuel Efficiency (or miles 
per gallon) is expected to grow by 0 . 026 MPG. 
2. All else being equal, when last year's miles per gallon 
economy figures increase by one (1) mile per gallon, 
it is most likely that this year's fuel efficiency will 
grow by 0.92 miles per gallon. 
Testing for heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is tested in order to determine if error 
terms have the same variance. It is tested for by running a 
Chisq test on the Rsq value taken from a regression run on the 
squared residuals and the predicted MPG from the original sample 
regression model. 
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Ho no heteroscedasticity 
Ha : heteroscedasticity 
Rsq esq = 0.029 
Test stat. = nRsq esq 
= 0.609 
Xsq 1, .005= 7.88 
At the 0.005 level of significance, the null hypothesis Ho is 
accepted. This shows that we do not have heteroscedasticity in 
the sample regression model. If heteroscedasticity did exist in 
the model, it would have caused the breakdown of the assumption 
that the error terms have the same variance. This breakdown 
would have biased the t-tests downward, making it easier to 
accept Ho more often than one should. Bad F-tests would have 
been another result of a breakdown in this assumption. 
Testing for Multicollinearity 
If one wants to assess the separate effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable, it is essential 
that these variables do not move together through the 
experiment. Multicollinearity can be tested for by examining 
the correlation matrix (see the accompanying output from the 
statistical package}. These results indicate that the real 
price of gasoline is not collinear with any other independent 
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variable. FEOREG and MPGLAS, however, seem to be connected 
throughout this regression run. This indicates that their 
individual significances may be unreliable. In the total scope 
of this regression, the collinear outcome is of minor importance 
as FEOREG produced an insignificant t-test, and thus does not 
yield any explanatory power to the model. Additionally, the 
overall significance of the equation is not compromised by the 
occurrence of multicollinearity between the federal regulation 
and the lagged fuel economy variables. 
Testing for Autocorrelation 
The Durbin Watson (OW) statistic indicates the level of first 
order autocorrelation. Autocorrelation would indicate a 
breakdown of some of the above outlined Ordinary Least Squares 
properties including low F- and t-tests. This, then, would 
indicate that a different estimator should be used. 
One would hope to see a OW value of exactly two (2) on the 
original regression print-out. OW statistics that lie between 
the upper and lower critical regions lead to indeterminate 
conclusions regarding the existence of autocorrelation. 
Statistics that fall below the lowest critical value or above 
the highest critical value indicate negative or positive first 
order correlation. 
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Reject Ho inconclusive accept Ho I inconclusive Reject Ho 
~~~~~- -~~~~~~~ ~~-2 ~~I~~~~~~~- -~~~~~ 
0 
0 
IL m 
1.03 
4-ID 
1.67 2 2.33 2.97 4 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1.835 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Ho = No Autocorrelation 
Ha = Autocorrelation 
Test Stat. = 1.835 
DL 21, 3, 0.05 = 1.03 
DU 21, 3, 0.05 = 1.67 
At the 0.05 level of significance, Ho is accepted. Accepting 
Ho indicates that no autocorrelation exists within this model. 
Model Limitations 
The previous econometric treatment of vehicle fuel economies 
is a product of many failures which should be reported to avoid 
unnecessary bias. The determination of the treated variables 
was not a random process, but rather the product of previous 
studies and modeling limitations. 
Initially, a basic economic correlation between the price of 
gasoline and vehicle fuel efficiency was suspected. This model 
resulted in the following results: 
MPG = 4.63 + 0.146 REALP 
(0.0059) 
55 
Rsq = 0.231 
F-stat= 6.022 
these results indicated a valid relationship with a 
statistically significant correlation between price and gas 
mileage (Appendix B.). 
A dummy variable as a measure of the effect of federal 
regulations was then added to the previous equation and the 
resulted in an estimated model with an F-statistic of 49.7. 
With Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.008, serious autocorrelation 
was expected in the regression. Most likely , the error terms in 
the population were correlated with each other, biassing upward 
the standard errors of the regression coefficients 
{Appendix C.). 
From the previous model, this study's final model was 
devised, including a lagged vehicle mileage variable (MPGLAS). 
This variable improved the Durbin-Watson statistic to 1.835, 
thus eliminating autocorrelation (Appendix A.). 
With autocorrelation solved, a fourth variable was include in 
the regression, FUTOT. This variable measured gasoline costs as 
a percentage of total vehicle costs. When this variable was 
included in the regression run, autocorrelation reappeared in 
the estimated model. FUTOT was subsequently dropped from the 
equation (Appendix D.). 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Contradictions of Regulation 
The separate regulatory pr~grams affecting the automobile 
industry have a mixed track record. At a very high marginal 
cost, emissions regulations have reduced air pollution from 
light-duty engines considerably. Safety regulations, also, seem 
to have worked well. Especially, when one takes into account 
recent passive restraint legislation. Fuel efficiency 
regulations appear to have been irrelevant until the decrease in 
gasoline prices. But how well have these regulatory policies 
been coordinated? As it seems, each regulatory program has been 
administered separately. 
A modern light-duty vehicle is a complex product. When an 
additional regulatory requirement is imposed to improve 
emissions control, fuel efficiency, or safety, it will have 
serious consequences for quite a few different aspects of the 
design process. For example, when the United States government 
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requ ired bumpers that could withstand five-mile-per- hour 
collisions , weight was add ed , diminishing fuel economy. This, 
in turn, led to changes in vehicle designs, i ncreases i n price , 
and compromises in performance. The conflict between safety and 
fuel efficiency, when consi dering vehicle weights, is both 
obvious and controversial. Clearly, a motorcycle driver is at a 
disadvantage in a col l ision with a truck . Looking at time- . 
series estimates of highway death rates, the average weight of 
the vehicle is inversely related to highway deaths (Crandall and 
Graham. "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile 
Safety, " p . 25). The relationship between weight and fuel 
efficiency is uncontroversial. All applicable studies s h ow that 
a significant inverse relationship exists. 
Safety standards and emission controls a r e in conflict with 
attempts to improve fuel economy. The counterproductive effects 
of the different regulatory goals make the achievement of safe 
roads , c l ean air , a nd improved vehicle econ omy even more 
complicat ed. 
Fuel Economy Projections 
Forecasts of fleet vehicle efficiencies in the long run are 
not accurate and cannot be attempted in the above model. 
Federal government proposals call for CAFE requirements of 40 to 
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50 mpg (at least) by the year 2000 (Flax, " Arthur. Debate over 
CAFE Heats up," p.23). These figures scare many manufacturers 
who are barely meeting current CAFE standards of 27.5 mpg. 
While domestic industry analysts argue that such figures are 
beyond what can reasonably be expected, independent analysts and 
environmentalists claim cost effective technologies already 
exists to produce substantial increases in fuel efficiency. 
Often , experimental and prototype vehicles are cited to display 
fuel -economy technology. These passenger vehicles include: 
*The Volvo LCP 2000, a 65 mpg diesel powered car 
*The Volkswagen ESO, a diesel vehicle that went 74 mpg in the 
city and 99 mpg on the highway 
*The Toyota AXV diesel, which returned 89 mpg city and 110 
mpg highway (Flax, Arthur. p .22). 
However, " exotic experimental vehicles that have achieved very 
high fuel economy are not evidence that cost-effective 
technology exists. These highly optimized experimental 
subcompacts do not have the utility and performance 
characteristics demanded by an overwhelming majority of 
consumers," said Marina v.N. Whitman, vice president of General 
Motors Public Affairs Staff (Flax, Arthur. p. 23). 
Depending on the market factors listed in the previous 
chapters, vehicle fuel economies could be higher or lower than 
the stated projections. If the current market conditions 
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prevail, it would be difficult for the new vehicle fleet to rise 
above today's fuel economy levels as the automobile industry 
will most likely make their decisions about the rate of 
penetration of technologies based on their perceptions of this 
market demand. Still a renewed public awareness in the 
environment as well as excessive oil imports could cause the 
fleet economy to exceed the projected fuel economy levels 
resulting from shifts in demand to more fuel efficient cars, 
lower average speeds, less power accessories, etc .... This, in 
turn, would cause a more rapid application of existing fuel 
saving technology to vehicle fleets, and stepped-up research 
into new technologies. 
Policy Recommendations 
The research findings presented in this report suggest broad 
policy implications for vehicle fuel conservation policies other 
than CAFE. 
Staying away from limitations on the supply of gasoline, the 
only way to achieve significant fuel savings in the near future 
is to increase the pump price of gasoline. In the long run, 
(more than four (4) years), technological improvements in 
automobile design offer additional potential for fuel savings. 
Nothing can and should be expected in this area sooner than the 
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indicated time period since lag times for design and 
implementation of new technologies exist. 
The above regression shows that, everything held equal, an 
increase in the pump price of gasoline will increase the fuel 
efficiency of vehicles and thus reduce the amount of fuel used 
for transportation purposes. Oil embargoes, environmental 
disasters, dry wells, or higher gasoline taxes could increase 
the price a consumer has to pay for a gallon of premium 
unleaded. Most likely, however, federal fuel taxes will be 
responsible for higher pump prices. It is assumed higher 
gasoline taxes will be fully reflected in the pump price of 
gasoline. This scenario will only take place if the supply of 
gasoline , or crude oil for that matter, is perfectly elastic. 
If a limited or inelastic supply is encountered, part of the 
burden of the gasoline tax will be carried by the producers 
rather than the consumers, and thus the tax would not be fully 
mirrored in the higher pump prices. 
Assuming a perfectly elastic supply of automotive fuel, the 
empirical study indicates that each additional cent of tax per 
gallon of gasoline will result ip about a 0.1 percent annual 
gasoline savings. 
However, this policy of higher fuel prices brings with it 
some serious social and economic consequences. Most likely, the 
impact of additional gasoline taxes will be more of a burden on 
the less affluent. The impact of the higher fuel prices on the 
proportion of wages spent for transportation is felt more 
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heavily on these lower income groups. After all, these groups 
drive the older , larger, and less fuel efficient cars. 
Additionally, most of the early gasoline savings (before the 
make-up of the fleet could be changed substantially), would 
result from a reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT). This 
implies a loss of personal mobility. This loss is difficult to 
justify in the land where: "a man ' s car is equated with a man ' s 
freedom. " 
Auto related employment would most likely decrease as a 
result of the reduced size of the fleet and the reduction in 
vehicle miles traveled. Initially, the decline in employment 
would be fueled by lower new car production; later, the 
reduction in employment would occur in the services sector 
because of VMT reductions. 
Through looking at higher gasoline taxes in other countries, 
we find evidence that there is room for higher duties in the 
United States (Figure 2.1). Other industrialized countries 
maintain gasoline prices three (3) to four (4) times as high as 
prices in the States and most of those higher prices result from 
higher duties. However, there seems to be a limit to the fuel 
economy improvements that can be obtained through higher fuel 
pump prices (Figure 2.2). Fuel economy figures in countries with 
high fuel prices have topped out at about thirty (30) miles per 
gallon (U.S., Congress, House, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on oversight and investigations). 
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In Closing 
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the increase 
in fleet fuel economies, across the line, is approximately what 
one should have expected given the rise in gasoline prices since 
1968. When real fuel prices started falling in the early 
eighties, CAFE standards turned into binding constraints on the 
producers, who wanted to satisfy the demand for larger, more 
powerful cars. 
Should the federal government continue to set Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy requirements in the light of all this 
opposition? Most likely, without further federal action, the 
total fleet fuel efficiency would continue to improve 
moderately, primarily because of vehicle turnover and modest 
improvements in technology. 
The problem here is to reconcile individual (larger cars) and 
societal ( curb the "Greenhouse effect") interests. our federal 
government has the power to curb our thirst for fossil fuels 
through various policy instruments and should do because of the 
global scope of our problems. The appropriate mechanism, 
though, does not appear to lie in sets of technological 
standards imposed on all new cars. These CAFE standards only 
invite "creative" answers from automobile manufacturers through 
65 
higher large car prices and content shuffling . 
A good start would be to impose a higher federal gasoline 
tax . Then the price of gasoline could be used to reduce the 
demand for big, inefficient cars and to urge producers to 
implement efficiency changes in their fleets without the 
disadvantages we are experiencing with CAFE. 
66 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Berenson, Mark L. and Levine David M. Basic Business Statistics, 
Concepts and Applications. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1986. 
Baumol, William J. and Blinder, Alan S. Economics Principles and 
Policy, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 
1988. 
Brown, Lester R.; Flavin, Christopher; and Norman, Colin., 
Running on Empty, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979. 
Crandall, Robert W., Regulating the Automobile, Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. 
Crandall, Robert W. and Graham, John D. "The Effect of Fuel 
Economy Standards on Automobile Safety," The Journal of Law 
and Economics, March 1988. 
Dauten, Carl A. and Valentine, LLoyd M. Business cycles and 
Forecasting, Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing 
Company , 1974. 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport. 55th, 56th and 
57th Round Tables on Transport Economies: The Future of the 
Use of the Car, Paris: Economic Research Center, 1982. 
Flax, Arthur. "Ecology, Car Demand Set to Clash, " Automotive 
News, March 27, 1989, p . 1, 81. 
67 
BIBLIOGRAPHY--CONTINUED 
Flax, Arthur. " Debate over CAFE Heats up ," Automotive news , May 
1, 1989, p . 1 , 22-24. 
Flint , Jerry . "With friends like this ... , " Forbes , June 26 , 
1989, p. 48. 
Groebner, David F. and Shannon, Patrick w. Business Statistics, 
A Decision- Making Approach , Columbus: Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1985. 
Jeanes, William. " The CAFE Society," car and Driver, July 1989, 
p. 5. 
Jeanes, William. "Of Good Deals and Level Fields," Car and 
Driver , Jan. 1990, p. 7. 
Kleit, Andrew N. The Impact of Automobile Fuel Economy 
Standards, Washington D. C.: Federal Trade Commission , Bureau 
of Economics, February 1988 . 
Kurylko, Diana T. "CAFE Credits Help Ford, GM, " Automotive 
News, May 1, 1989, p . 26 . 
Kurylko, Diana T. " The Bush Revolution : Tighter Rules ," 
Automotive News, Sept. 18, 1989, p. 1, 52-54. 
Kwoka, John E. Jr. " The limits of Market oriented Regulatory 
Techniques: The Case of Automobile Fuel Economy," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1983, p. 695-704. 
68 
BIBLIOGRAPHY--CONTINUED 
McGillivray, Robert G. Automobile Gasoline Conservation, 
Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1976. 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States . 
MVMA Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures 1987, Detroit: MVMA of the 
United States , Inc., 1987. 
Off ice of Technology Assessement, Congressional Board of the 
97th Congress. Increased Automobile Fuel Efficiency and 
synthetic Fuels, Washington D.C.: OTA, 1982. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Automobile Fuel Consumption in Actual Traffic Conditions, 
Paris: OECD, 1982. 
Plotkin, Steven E. " The Road to Fuel Efficiency, " Environment, 
July/August 1989, p. 18-42. 
Simanaitis, Dennis. "Welcome to the (Over?)Regulated Nineties," 
Road & Track, February 1990, p. 92-95. 
Society of Automotive Engineers. Automotive Fuel Economy 
(Selected SAE Papers 1965 - 1975), Warrendale, PA: SAE Inc., 
1976 . 
Society of Automotive Engineers. Automotive Fuel Economy Part 2 
(Selected SAE Papers through 1979). Warrendale, PA: SAE Inc., 
1979. 
69 
BIBLIOGRAPHY--CONTINUED 
Stucker, J. P. ; Burright, B. K.; and Mooz, W. E. Evaluating Fuel 
Economy Mandates, Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, 
1980 . 
Stucker, J. P. et al. Evaluating Fuel Economy Taxes, Santa 
Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, 1979. 
Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers, Chicago and London: The 
University press, 1973 . 
U.S. , Congress, Senate , Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Energy Regulation and Conservation of the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources on Automobile Fuel Efficiency 
Standards , 101st Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1989. 
U.S., Congress, House, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce on Fuel Economy Issues , 101st Cong. , 1st sess ., 
April 10, 1989. 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Consumer of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation on Global Warming and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standards, 101st Cong. , 1st sess., May 2 , 
1989. 
Versical, David. "Small-Car Content Shift Leads GM ' s CAFE 
Plan ," Automotive News, June 26, 1989 , p. 60-61. 
70 
BIBLIOGRAPHY--CONTINUED 
Winston, Clifford et al., Blind Intersection? Policy and the 
Automobile Industry . Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1987. 
Appendix A 
SMPL 1968 1988 
21 Observations 
LS // Dependent Variable is MPG 
==================================================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT . 2- TAIL SIG. 
==================================================================== 
c 
REALP 
FEDREG 
MPG LAS 
-1.0162426 
0 . 0264787 
0.7526504 
0.9211985 
1.5666644 
0.0101815 
0.7592769 
0 . 0615971 
-0.6486664 
2.6006629 
0.9912726 
14.955214 
0.525 
0.019 
0.335 
0.000 
==================================================================== 
R-squared 
Adjusted R- squared 
S.E. of regression 
Durbin- Watson stat 
Log likelihood 
0.988111 
0.986013 
0.679475 
1 . 835391 
-19 . 46383 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
20 . 65476 
5.745221 
7.848668 
470 . 9566 
==================================================================== 
covariance Matrix 
==================================================================== 
C,C 
C,FEDREG 
REALP,REALP 
REALP,MPGLAS 
FEDREG,MPGLAS 
2 . 454437 
0 . 976898 
0.000104 
0.000204 
-0.041047 
C,REALP 
C,MPGLAS 
REALP,FEDREG 
FEDREG,FEDREG 
MPGLAS,MPGLAS 
- 0.013085 
- 0.076439 
- 0 . 004236 
0.576501 
0.003794 
==================================================================== 
71 
==================================================================== 
Residual Plot obs RESIDUAL ACTUAL FITTED 
=================================================================== 
* I 1968 -0.32885 14.6900 15.0188 
* I 1969 -0.30224 14.7400 15.0422 
*I 1970 -0.11649 14.8500 14.9665 
. * I 1971 -0.61309 14.3700 14.9831 
* 1972 -0.01590 14.4800 14.4959 
: * 1973 -0.52138 14.1500 14.6714 
* 1974 -0.67636 14.2100 14.8864 
* 1975 0.90926 15.7900 14.8807 
* 1976 1.16878 17.4600 16.2912 
* 1977 0.49627 18.3100 17.8137 
*. 1978 0.62533 19.8900 19.2647 
* 1979 -1.04475 20.2500 21.2947 
* 1980 1.15810 23.5100 22.3519 
* 1981 -0 .22678 25.1600 25.3868 
* 1982 -0.42045 26.0600 26.4804 
* 1983 -0.73181 26.3500 27.0818 
* 1984 -0.30625 26.8600 27.1663 
* 1985 -0 .00134 27.5500 27.5513 
I * : 1986 0.58061 28.0500 27.4694 
I * 1987 0.23466 28.3500 28.1153 
I * 1988 0.13267 28.6700 28.5373 
==================================================================== 
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Appendix B 
SHPL 1967 1988 
22 Observations 
LS // Dependent Variable is MPG 
==================================================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T - STAT. 2 - TAIL SIG. 
========= ========= ====== === == ===== ======== =================== ===== == 
c 
REALP 
4.6348954 
0.1459539 
6 . 5097201 
0.0594731 
0.7119961 
2.4541158 
0 . 485 
0.023 
======= ========= ========== ===== =========== ========= ======= ========== 
R-squared 
Adjusted R- squared 
S.E. of regression 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Log like l ihood 
0 . 231440 
0.193012 
5.168037 
0. 130434 
-66 . 30308 
Hean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F- statistic 
20.38000 
5.752969 
534.17 21 
6.022684 
--- -----------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Covariance Matrix 
==================================================================== 
c,c 
REALP,REALP 
42 . 37646 
0 . 003537 
C,REALP - 0.381567 
====== ======================== ====== == ====== ======================== 
73 
==================================================================== 
Residual Plot obs RESIDUAL ACTUAL FITTED 
==================================================================== 
* I 1967 -4.62028 14.6100 19 . 2303 
. * I 1968 -4.14621 14.6900 18.8362 
* I 1969 -3.81889 14.7400 18.5589 
* I 1970 -3.03751 14 . 8500 17.8875 
* I 1971 - 3.05045 14.3700 17.4205 
* I 1972 - 2 .69233 14.4800 17.1723 
: * I 1973 -3.43100 14 .1 500 17.5810 
* : I 1974 -6.23170 14 . 2100 20.4417 
. * I 1975 -4.31600 15 . 7900 20.1060 
* I 1976 -2.39788 17.4600 19 .8579 
* I 1977 - 1.46031 18.3100 19 . 7703 
* I 1978 0 . 58674 19.8900 19.3033 
* I 1979 -2.22046 20.2500 22.4705 
* I 1980 -2.95959 23.5100 26.4696 
* I 1981 -1.48474 25.1600 26.6447 
* I 1982 1.76512 26 .0600 24 . 2949 
* : I 1983 3.31032 26.3500 23 . 0397 
* I 1984 4.82741 26.8600 22.0326 
* I 1985 5.98446 27.5500 21.5655 
* I 1986 10.4398 28.0500 17.6102 
* I 1987 9 . 71813 28.3500 18.6319 
* I 1988 9.23538 28.6700 19 .4346 
==================================================================== 
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Appendix C 
SMPL 1967 1988 
22 Observations 
LS // Dependent variable is MPG 
=== ====== ====== ===================================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2 - TAIL SIG. 
========= ===== ========= ======== =================== ================== 
c 
RE ALP 
FE DREG 
17.521089 
-0.0234756 
10.782797 
3.4076304 
0.0342819 
1. 2702 48 2 
5.1417222 
- 0.6847823 
8.4887328 
0 . 000 
0.502 
0.000 
==================================================================== 
R-squared 
Adjusted R- squared 
S.E. of regression 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Log likelihood 
0 . 839635 
0 . 822754 
2.422034 
1.008812 
-49.06537 
Mean of dependent var 
S .D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared res id 
F- statistic 
20.38000 
5.752969 
111.4587 
49.73972 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Covariance Matrix 
=========================================== ====== =================== 
c,c 
C,FEDREG 
REALP,FEDREG 
11.61194 
1.928281 
- 0.02535 3 
C,REALP 
REALP,REALP 
FEDREG,FEDREG 
- 0.114106 
0 . 001175 
1.613530 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
75 
==================================================================== 
Residual Plot obs RESIDUAL ACTUAL FITTED 
==================================================================== 
*I 1967 -0.56353 14 . 6100 15.1735 
*I 1968 -0.54691 14.6900 15.2369 
*I 1969 -0.54151 14 . 7400 15.2815 
*I 1970 - 0.53950 14.8500 15.3895 
* I 1971 - 1.09462 14.3700 15 . 4646 
* I 1972 -1.02453 14.4800 15.5045 
* I 1973 -1 .28880 14.1500 15.4388 
* I 1974 -0.76868 14.2100 14.9787 
I * 1975 0.75733 15.7900 15 . 0327 
I * 1976 2.38742 17.4600 15.0726 
I : * 1977 3.22333 18.3100 15.0867 
* I 1978 -6.05459 19.8900 25.9446 
* I 1979 -5.18516 20.2500 25 . 4352 
* I 1980 -1.28193 23.5100 24.7919 
I* 1981 0 . 39624 25.1600 24.7638 
I * 1982 0.91828 26.0600 25.1417 
I * 1983 1 . 00639 26.3500 25.3436 
I * 1984 1.35441 26.8600 25.5056 
I * . 1985 1.96929 27.5500 25 . 5807 
I * : 1986 1.83310 28.0500 26 . 2169 
I * 1987 2.29743 28.3500 26.0526 
I . * 1988 2.74654 28.6700 25.9235 
==================================================================== 
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Appe ndix D 
SMPL 1973 1987 
15 Observations 
LS // Dependent V~riable is MPG 
======== ======================== ==================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD . ERROR 'I'-STAT . 2-TAIL SIG. 
=============================== ===================================== 
c 
REALP 
FE DREG 
FUT OT 
27.903683 
0.0105374 
6.2153832 
- 0.4602 197 
7.9574980 
0.0470893 
2.8686899 
0.3159289 
3.5065900 
0.2237746 
2 . 1666277 
-1.4 567190 
0 . 005 
0.827 
0.053 
0 . 173 
=============================== ===================================== 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S . E. of regression 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Log likelihood 
0 . 789014 
0.731473 
2.704631 
0.846082 
-33.88240 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F- statistic 
22.13000 
5.219321 
80.46534 
13.71209 
==================================================================== 
covariance Matrix 
================================================================ ==== 
c,c 
C,FEDREG 
REALP,REALP 
REALP,FUTOT 
FEDREG,FUTOT 
63.32177 
-13.77808 
0.002217 
- 0.007086 
0 . 738735 
C,REALP 
C,FUTOT 
REALP,FEDREG 
FEDREG,FEDREG 
FUTOT,FUTOT 
-0. 026517 
-2. 094503 
- 0.083628 
8.229382 
0.099811 
============================ ======================================== 
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==================================================================== 
Residual Plot obs RESIDUAL ACTUAL FITTED 
========================================= =========================== 
* I 1973 -0.69767 14.1500 14.8477 
* I 1974 -1.94873 14.2100 16.1587 
I * 1975 0.57595 15.7900 15.2141 
I * 1976 1 . 57353 17.4600 15 . 8865 
I* 1977 0.49693 18.3100 17.8131 
* I 1978 -4.1 5076 19.8900 24.0408 
* I 1979 - 5 . 72223 20.2500 25 . 9722 
* I 1980 -0.67997 23.5100 24 . 1900 
*I 1981 -0.51531 25.1600 25 . 6753 
I * 1982 1.79693 26 . 0600 24 . 2631 
I * 1983 1.90142 26 . 3500 24.4486 
I * 1984 2.62220 26.8600 24 . 2378 
I *. 1985 2.42547 27 . 5500 25 . 1245 
I * 1986 0.90994 28.0500 27 .1401 
I * 1987 1.41231 28 . 3500 26.9377 
==================================================================== 
78 
==================================================================== 
obs MPG RE ALP FE DREG MPG LAS FUTOT 
================================================ ==================== 
1967 14.61000 100.0000 0.000000 NA NA 
1968 14 . 69000 97.30000 0.000000 14. 61000 NA 
1969 14 . 74000 95 . 40000 0.000000 14.69000 NA 
1970 14 . 85000 90 . 80000 0.000000 14 . 74000 NA 
1971 14.37000 87.60000 0.000000 14.85000 NA 
1972 14 .48000 85.90000 0.000000 14.37000 NA 
1973 14.15000 88.70000 0.000000 14.48000 30.40000 
1974 14. 21000 108.3000 0.000000 14.15000 28.00000 
1975 15.79000 106.0000 0.000000 14.21000 30.00000 
1976 17 . 46000 104.3000 0.000000 15.79000 28.50000 
1977 18 . 31000 103.7000 0.000000 17.46000 24.30000 
1978 19 . 89000 100.5000 1.000000 18 . 31000 24.20000 
1979 20 . 25000 122.2000 1.000000 19 . 89000 20.50000 
1980 23 . 51000 149.6000 1.000000 20.25000 25.00000 
1981 25.16000 150.8000 1.000000 23.51000 21.80000 
1982 26.06000 134.7000 1.000000 25 . 16000 24.50000 
1983 26.35000 126 . 1000 1.000000 26.06000 23.90000 
1984 26.86000 119.2000 1.000000 26.35000 24 . 20000 
1985 27.55000 116.0000 1.000000 26.86000 22 . 20000 
1986 28.05000 88.90000 1 . 000000 27.55000 17.20000 
1987 28.35000 95.90000 1.000000 28.05000 17.80000 
1988 28.67000 101. 4000 1.000000 28.35000 NA 
========================= ======== ================= ========= ========= 
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